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Governance and Private Investment 
in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the issue of the low level of private investment in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, with special emphasis on the role of governance. Based on the existing 
literature, we have categorized what types of governance institutions are more detrimental to 
entrepreneurial investments. We have then estimated a simultaneous model of private investment 
and governance quality where economic policies concurrently explain both variables. Our 
empirical results show that governance plays a significant role in private investment decisions.  
This result is particularly true in the case of “Administrative Quality” in the form of control of 
corruption, bureaucratic quality, investment-friendly profile of administration, and law and order, 
as well as for “Political Stability”. Evidence in favor of “Public Accountability” seems, however, 
less robust. Our estimations also stress that structural reforms -- such as financial development 
and trade openness – and human development affect private investment decisions directly, and/or 
through their positive impact on governance. These findings bring new empirical evidence on the 
subject of private investment in the developing world and in MENA countries in particular. 
 
 
 
Keywords: governance, private investment, Institutions, Middle East and North Africa.  
JEL Classification: P4, E2, E6, D02 
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1. Introduction 
During the 1980s and 1990s, private investment in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) has on average shown a decreasing trend. With the liberalization of 
economies and the acceleration of reforms, private investment increased throughout the 
world in the 1990s. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries did not follow 
this pattern. While private investment to GDP declined by 2.4 percent in the region, this 
rate increased by 4.8 percent in Latin America (LAC), 15.8 percent in Africa (AFR), 23.4 
in South Asia and 14 percent in East Asia (EAP), despite the financial crisis. 
Figure 1: Private Investment by Region 1  Figure 2: Private Investment in MENA Countries  
  (% GDP)        (% GDP)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Authors’ calculations  Source : Authors’ calculations 
This paper addresses the issue of the low level of private investment in the MENA 
region, with special emphasis on the role of governance. In fact, the MENA countries 
have on average been characterized by a clear deficit in “good” governance institutions. 
This shortfall is particularly related to democratic institutions such as political rights, 
civil liberties, or freedom of the press. Similarly, the quality of the administration has 
also been of some concern. These deficiencies have been reported as being responsible 
for the slow economic activity in MENA (see El Badawi, 2002; and the World Bank, 
2004).  
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These results are in line with a growing literature on governance which suggests 
that successful market-based economies need “good” governance institutions2. However, 
the channel investigated to date concerns more the impact of governance on economic 
growth3, GDP per capital4, or volatility of the economic activity5. Little is empirically 
done to analyze the effects of institutions on private investment. As far as private 
investment is concerned, the literature on the role of governance has essentially focused on 
the effect of the rule of law – more specifically on the security of property rights which is 
the best documented and supported by the empirical evidence6. Other components of 
governance are less documented and the empirical validation is not as successful. This is 
not only the case for corruption and bureaucratic quality7, but also for democratic 
participation which lacks theoretical and empirical precision8. A few studies have, 
however, addressed more successfully the link between political instability, policy 
uncertainties and firms’ decision to invest9.  
 Governance, however, is part of the investment climate of a country. Investment 
decisions are mainly driven by profitability motives (Jorgenson, 1963). The forward- 
looking nature of investment underlines the importance of a stable and secure 
environment – in particular the security of property rights. At the same time, “good” 
governance institutions are viewed as reducing uncertainty and promoting efficiency (see 
North, 1981). In this respect, and as reported by the World Bank (2004), better 
governance improves the investment climate by improving bureaucratic performances 
and predictability. This in turn reduces uncertainty, as well as the cost of doing business. 
Better governance also contributes to the effective delivery of public goods that are 
necessary for productive business. Cross-country correlations using broad proxies for 
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investment climate quality suggest a positive link between the investment climate and 
private investment  decisions10.  
 As a part of the reflection on the channel through which governance may affect 
economic performance, one strand of the literature has recently reconsidered the role of 
economic policies in explaining cross-country economic achievements. This research has 
also been of importance for our interest in the determinants of private investment. Recent 
work on the role of both governance and economic policies has found that governance 
institutions are the dominant factor with little, if any, independent influence of policies11. 
However, these results stem from endogeneity and specification problems, as pointed out 
by Sachs (2003). In fact, economic policies are likely to affect cross-country variations in 
governance quality. There is, in particular, some evidence that greater openness to trade 
and stronger competition are conducive to better governance12. Given these conditions, 
economic policies may explain economic performances through their impact on 
governance13. In the case of private investment, we show that both effects (i.e., direct and 
indirect) can be brought together if the model chosen is well specified14. We estimate in 
particular a simultaneous model of private investment and of various forms of 
governance institutions, where economic policies concurrently explain both variables.  
In this paper, we also address other shortfalls of the empirical literature on 
governance and economic performances. We intend, in particular, to categorize what types 
of governance institutions are more detrimental to entrepreneur investments. To this end, 
we introduce a large set of governance variables which are not typically used in the 
literature on the determinants of private investment. Since these indicators are likely to be 
correlated, we process a few aggregated indicators using the principal component 
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analysis methodology. Based on the existing literature, we categorize so called 
governance institutions in three broad clusters as “Administrative Quality”, (QA), “Public 
Accountability” (PA), and “Political Stability” (PS). We also generate a global indicator 
of governance (GOV) which summarizes these three aspects15. This method allows in a 
second step to evaluate the contribution of the initial indicators to the private 
investment’s decisions. This information will be useful to understand which factors 
explain the low investment’s performances of the region. In this paper, human 
development and economic policy variables have been similarly processed.  
Our empirical approach relies also on panel data (cross section-time series 
analysis) which is suitable -- contrary to previous studies -- to jointly assessing the impact 
of economic policies and governance institutions on private investments: the time series 
dimension captures the variability of policies through time and the cross section 
dimension covers the governance variables which tend to evolve slowly. This paper also 
acknowledges the deficiencies of existing data on governance as being subjective and 
outcome-based rather than representing the quality of actual institutions. However, this 
paper points out that these deficiencies do not constitute a severe problem in analyzing 
the effects of governance on private investment. Whether actual or not, what is important 
for the private investors is the perceived quality of governance at the time of investment.  
This paper also benefits from a newly constructed data set on private investment. 
The ultimate purpose of the existing paper on investment is to determine which factors 
are central in the decision-making process of private entrepreneurs to invest.  However, 
due to the lack of comparable data on private investment, most of the earlier studies use 
aggregate investment as a proxy for private investment.  Later, the International Finance 
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Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank launched a project which addresses the private 
investments of various developing countries from 1970 to 1999.  Studies using this 
disaggregated data on private investment show that private and public investment can 
have very different determinants (Aizenman and Marion, 1999). Therefore, disaggregated 
data need to be utilized in order to capture the investment-conducive factors in today’s 
globalized economies.  Building on the IFC series, our new data set covers 99 countries 
(63 for high quality data) over the period 1970-2002.  
Finally, as previously mentioned, our empirical model allows for the simultaneous 
estimation of private investments and of various types of governance institutions.  This 
model is also justified by the fact that -- in addition to economic policies -- changes in 
private investment can influence the quality of governance.  Moreover, some hidden 
factors are likely to affect in parallel private investment and governance institutions. Our 
empirical results show that governance institutions play a significant role in private 
investment decisions.  This result is particularly true in the case of “Administrative 
Quality” (QA) in the form of control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, investment 
friendly profile of administration, and law and order. Similarly, “Political Stability” (PS) 
significantly generates higher private investment.  Evidence in favor of “Public 
Accountability” seems, however, less robust.  
This paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces our 
classification of governance institutions to determine which institutions are detrimental 
for entrepreneur investments. The third section presents the other determinants of private 
investment which will be taken into consideration in our empirical analysis and highlights 
the importance of these factors for the MENA countries. The fourth section presents the 
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characteristics of the data used. The fifth section introduces the private investment model 
tested and the results of the estimations. The sixth section uses this model to determine 
which factors would boost the level of MENA’s private investments in the future. The 
last section presents the conclusions.   
 
2. Governance Institutions: An Attempt at Classification  
A first step in our analysis of the link between governance and private investment 
has been to differentiate and categorize the numerous different dimensions of 
governance, to better understand which institutions are investment-conducive. Existing 
literature on the classification of governance institutions provides some alternatives. 
Various authors have aggregated certain indices to better capture the common features of 
the existing data.  
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) categorize governance institutions in six 
broad groups.  Their measures of governance indicators are based on 194 variables drawn 
from 17 different sources, in order to measure six different aspects of governance. 
“Government Effectiveness” and “Regulatory Quality” summarize the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies. The respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions which govern their interactions is categorized as “Rule of Law” 
and “Control of Corruption”. "Political Stability and Absence of Violence" measure 
perceptions of likelihood that the government in power will not be destabilized and 
indicate the continuity of policies. “Voice and Accountability” captures the process by 
which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of their government 
(see Annex. 2 for more details on these indicators). The World Bank (2004) has used two 
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indices on “Public Accountability” and “Administrative Quality” by aggregating the 
existing relevant data sets for these features of governance.  
Our choice of indicators has been limited by the lack of annual data available for 
a large sample of countries over long periods of time. Considering the existing 
classifications of governance data, this paper categorizes the governance variables which 
are likely to affect individual investors’ decision into three broad clusters: 
“Administrative Quality” (QA), “Public Accountability” (PA), and “Political Stability” 
(PS).  
 2.1. Quality of Administration (QA) 
The first set of candidates is intended to provide information on the ability of 
government to deal with investors and to provide them with an investment-friendly and 
reliable context in which to conduct their investment projects. Following the World Bank 
(2004), we have defined the first governance variable as the “Quality of Administration”. 
This variable incorporates four indicators from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG, 1999), namely: (a) “Control over Corruption”, (b) “Quality of Bureaucracy”, (c) 
“Investment Profile”, and (d) “Law and Order” (see definitions of variables in Annex 3). 
These institutions are part of the investment climate of a country. They promote 
investments by reducing the costs and risks of doing business.  
 Corruption often has adverse effects on economic activities.  This fact is well 
documented and is often described as one of the major constraints facing enterprises in 
the developing world (see the World Bank 2005). In his cross-country analysis, Mauro 
(1995) shows that corruption reduces growth. Gupta, Davooli and Alonso-Terme (2002) 
stress that corruption exacerbates income inequality and poverty. Mo (2001) documents a 
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causal chain of interest for our work, linking corruption to low growth through reduced 
human and physical capital. In fact, for private investors, corruption increases investment 
and operation costs, as well as uncertainties about the timing and effects of the 
application of government regulations. Corruption raises also the investment and 
operational costs of public enterprises, which are detrimental to private investment 
through insufficient and low quality infrastructures (see Tanzi and Davooli, 1997). The 
same conclusions have been reached for the effects of bureaucratic quality on the 
economic activity (see Evans and Rauch, 2000).  
The “Quality of Bureaucracy” index of ICRG summarizes the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies. Moreover, the “Quality of 
Bureaucracy” index indicates that “countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and 
expertise govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous 
from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and 
training”.  
 The “Investment Profile” is a measure of the “government’s attitude to inward 
investment as determined by the assessment of four sub-components: risk to operations, 
taxation, profit repatriation and labor costs”. Because investors are making long-term 
decisions, risks to operations and other uncertainties about future policies are detrimental 
to investment decisions. Taxation and labor costs have also a first order implication on 
costs, and therefore on decisions to invest. Although government regulations and taxation 
are reasonable and warranted in order to protect the general public and to generate 
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revenues to finance the delivery of public services and infrastructures, overregulation and 
over-taxation deter investments by raising business start-up and operating costs.  
In the “Law and Order” index, the law sub-component provides an “assessment 
of the strength and impartiality of the legal system”, while the order sub-component 
concerns the “popular observance of the law.” Although many aspects of the business 
environment affect investments, the security of property rights is the most important and 
the better documented issue. Because of the forward-looking nature of investment, 
investors need institutions that preserve the right of private property, ensure equitable and 
consistent rule of law in protecting this right, as well as effective incentives to respect and 
enforce it. A reliable judiciary, in particular, reduces transaction costs for businesses and 
sends positive signals to investors that rules of law will be equitably and consistently 
protected and enforced. On the empirical side, the issue of property rights and of rule of 
law has been widely covered by the literature, and the results of cross-country analysis 
are robust to various tests and specifications16.  
 2.2. Public Accountability (PA) 
The second set of indicators measures “Public Accountability”.  This index 
consists of two indicators from Freedom House (FH): “Civil Liberties” and “Political 
Rights”. 
Public accountability is part of the investment climate of an economy. Because 
fixed capital investments are generally irreversible, private investment decisions are 
highly sensitive to the perception of the credibility and tenacity of the political regime, as 
well as of policies17. An open and participatory political system provides stability of 
social institutions and ensures a broad public support to policies, which are in this case 
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more sustainable in the long run. Public accountability is a guaranty of transparency and 
of better availability of information, which also help governments to build credibility. 
Public accountability provides access to policymakers and can hold them responsible for 
failures in implementing policies. In particular, freedom of press, free political parties 
and open elections contribute to government’s legitimacy and give voice to citizens in the 
decision-making process. On the empirical side, the literature on democratic participation 
has focused on the effects of transparency and accountability on growth, using data on 
civil liberties, political rights, and freedom of press from various sources. The empirical 
validation has, however, produced mitigated success18. The work of Pastor and Sung 
(1995) is one of the few to have been able to show a positive effect of various indicators 
of democratic institutions on private investment in the developing world.  
 2.3. Political Stability (PS) 
The last set of variables is intended to measure the “Political Stability”.  Political 
instability increases the uncertainty in the economy and deters the risk-averse 
entrepreneurs to take action for profitable investment opportunities. The political stability 
index includes the following variables from ICRG: “Government Stability”, “Internal 
Conflict”, “External Conflict”, and “Ethnic Tensions”. Various authors, using different 
indicators of political uncertainties, have brought empirical evidence that institutions 
associated with political instability hamper aggregate investment19.  
All the political and governance indicators have been aggregated by using 
principal component analysis (PCA) to account for the multi-collinearity issue in using 
these potentially correlated variables in the same regression equation. In addition, we 
have generated a global indicator of governance (GOV) which summarizes the 
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information contained in the three previous indicators (QA, PA and PS). Results of PCA 
are given in Annex 4.  
 
3. Other Determinants of Private Investment  
Although the importance of private investment has been widely developed in the 
literature, there is less evidence on what induces private firms to invest in developing 
countries. In fact, developing countries do not operate in a competitive environment and 
face constraints that are not accounted for in the neoclassical model. This partly explains 
why most of the economists do not agree on the subject of the determinants of investment 
in the developing countries20. This phenomenon is also the case for MENA economies, 
for which the empirical literature is very deficient21. In this paper, we address some of 
these constraints, in particular the ones linked to economic policy and to the quality of 
governance institutions.  
3.1. The Neoclassical Accelerator Model 
In the macroeconomics literature, the neoclassical flexible accelerator model is 
the most widely accepted model of investment. This model is based on the neoclassical 
idea of the theory of the firm (Jorgenson, 1963), which postulates that enterprises decide 
to invest so as to generate more profit in the future. The investment function is derived 
from the optimization problem of the firms, which maximize current and expected profits 
by equating the production prices to their marginal costs. Firms will invest so long as the 
marginal benefit of doing so outweighs the additional cost. The net investment is the 
gradual adjustment of the actual capital stock to its desired level, which is derived from 
maximization of profit. The determinants of investment in the neoclassical flexible 
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accelerator model include the expected aggregate demand (the accelerator), the user cost 
of capital, the wage rate and the initial capital stock.  
This model postulates, however, that firms operate in competitive markets, which 
contradicts the structural and institutional factors prevailing in developing countries. 
Even though the empirical tests of the model appear to be successful for several 
developed countries, the firms in developing countries face certain constraints that are not 
accounted for in the conventional neoclassical theory22. It is some of these constraints (in 
particular those of specific interest for the MENA region) that are discussed below.  
3.2. Structural Reforms 
 
Among the most common constraints faced by developing countries is the deficit 
in economic reforms. This is the case of the MENA countries which have lagged behind 
other regions in terms of reforming their economy (Nabli and Véganzonès -Varoudakis, 
2004). Structural reforms constitute an important determinant of the actual and future 
profitability of private investment. We have considered trade policy and financial 
development as part of our structural reforms index.  
By providing more opportunities and incentives for the firms to invest, the 
financial development is an important part of private investment decisions. A developed 
financial system mobilizes and allocates resources to the enterprises. A developed 
financial system is also expected to be more efficient due to an increasing technological 
specialization, which leads to a better selection of projects and a more advanced 
diversification of risks. This allows the firms to finance more investment projects and 
increases the productivity of new investments (see Levine, 1997, for a synthesis). In 
addition, given the lack of well-functioning financial markets, the neoclassical 
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assumption of the flexible accelerator model about the availability of credit supply by the 
banking sector cannot be taken for granted in developing countries. This discrepancy also 
occurs because of the public deficits and public debt, which can lead to financial 
repression and to eviction of private investment. On the empirical side, the impact of 
financial development on private investment is now well documented23. In his survey of 
investment functions in developing countries, Rama (1993) presents the positive effect of 
financial development on private investment in 21 of the 31 papers surveyed.  
Trade reforms constitute another factor that can stimulate private investment 
decisions. Trade openness increases competitiveness and provides access to enlarged 
markets (Balassa, 1978; Feder, 1982). Trade openness can be at the origin of economies 
of scale and of productivity gains. In addition, trade openness influences the availability 
of external credit -- considering the general consensus on the role of tradable goods in 
providing positive externalities in the form of collateral for external financing (Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy, 2001).  
All these factors create favorable conditions for the enterprises to invest. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, economic reforms are also expected to affect 
private investment through their impact on the quality of governance institutions. There 
is, in particular, some evidence that greater openness to trade and stronger competition 
are conducive to governance improvement 24. Opening up markets may help to weaken 
vested interests and reduce rents derived from prevailing economic and institutional 
arrangements. Trade openness may also lead to demands for governance institutions more 
suited to an increasingly varied and complex range of transactions (See IMF, 2003).  
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3.3. Human Capital  
Human capital is part of the investment climate of an economy and is generally 
considered as a complementary factor of physical capital. Here, we have considered 
health and education as part of the human capital index. Human capital stimulates private 
capital formation by raising the profitability of investment. Human capital can also be at 
the origin of positive externalities25. Because skilled workers are better in dealing with 
changes, a skilled work force is essential for firms to adopt new and more productive 
technologies26. Besides, new technologies generally require significant organizational 
changes, which are handled better by a skilled workforce27. Human capital also gives the 
opportunity to the enterprises to expand or enter new markets.  
 Moreover, human capital entails better governance institutions.  More educated 
people with higher life expectancy become more competent bureaucrats and -- in addition 
to better monitoring of the functioning of government officials -- demand for better 
quality of bureaucracy (Galor et al., 2005).  In addition, educational attainment reduces 
the political instability by generating more avenues to reconcile the opposing parties.  
This idea constitutes one of the classical approaches in the literature to highlight the 
importance of education in bringing better governance institutions (Lipset, 1959).  From 
the democratic accountability point of view, a more educated society is more likely to be 
enfranchised in terms of civil rights and liberties (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001).  These 
considerations justify that human capital also appears as an explanatory factor of private 
investment through its impact on the quality of governance institutions.  
 Although educational attainment has improved in the majority of developing 
countries, many firms still rate inadequate skills and education of workers as severe 
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obstacles to their operations28. This is the case of the MENA region, where progress is 
still needed in order for the region to catch up with South East Asia and Latin America29. 
To meet this challenge and as pointed out by the World Bank (2004), MENA countries 
have to gear up their educational system both to improve basic education and to equip the 
labor force with skills appropriate for enterprises to invest efficiently.  
 
4. Some Considerations on the Data Used 
4.1. A New Data Set on Private Investment  
Data on the breakdown of investments as either private or public are scarce. The 
best available data set on private investment was provided by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank30. However, this data set covers only the period 
from 1970 to 1999.  It also has some limitations for certain countries in terms of quality 
of the breakdown between public and private investment. This is most often due to the 
status of the state- owned enterprises, for which investment data are not always available, 
and which are in this case included in the private investment series.  
 Considering these pitfalls of existing data, we have reexamined the IFC data set 
and updated the private investment series for the available years after 1999. More 
importantly, we have carefully checked the IFC private investment series and compared 
them to the national sources where available, as well as to the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) series. This has been done in close collaboration with 
the country economists of these two institutions. We have thus been able to generate high 
quality data for the majority of our sample countries, as well as for other countries which 
can be considered as relatively accurate. This private investment series which covers 63 
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countries has been used in the empirical analysis (see in Annex 1 the list of countries). 
We have also generated a broader set of private investment series which includes 
countries for which the distinction between private and public investment is not as 
satisfactory, but which can be used for robustness analysis (this data set covers 99 
countries).  
4.2. Nature of Data on Governance 
The data usually used in governance are produced by independent private firms 
who provide consulting services to international investors such as the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the Heritage Foundation (HF), the Freedom House (FH) or 
the Fraser Institute (FI). To a certain extent, these indices provide very similar 
information on various aspects of governance. These data sets have certain common 
features. First of all, they can be considered to be subjective. They measure the 
perceptions of governance quality rather its actual quality. They also measure outcomes 
rather than actual rules (see Glaeser et al., 2004). Finally, given that governance 
institutions do not change easily in theory, institutional indices are supposed to be rather 
persistent, even though they are relatively volatile in existing data sets. 
All these factors appear contrary to using governance indices commonly used in 
the literature. In fact, these characteristics are very useful in determining investor 
perceptions on the quality of governance at the time of their investment. Indeed, what we 
are more concerned about is not the actual governance quality per se, but its perception 
by the private sector since our ultimate aim is to identify the determinants of private 
investment. This paper strongly shows that, in addition to the conventional determinants 
of private investment, governance institutions – whether perceived or real – are 
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detrimental to investors’ decision to invest. Hence, we allow the possibility that perceived 
institutions differ from the actual institutions.  It is quite possible that in our framework, 
even though quality of actual governance is not high, private investors tend to perceive 
that their investment projects are protected by good institutions or vice versa.   
To illustrate this idea, it can be noticed that following economic crises, 
governance indices of crises-hit countries can vary enormously.  It is hard to believe that 
institutions change drastically in a short period of time, but it is reasonable to argue that 
perceptions of governance institutions in the eyes of beholders, i.e., investors, are altered 
through the crises.  Investors modify their expectations from the institutions when new 
information is revealed in a crises-hit economy.     
One explanation for these drastic upheavals in governance indices of crises-hit 
countries is that investors definitely have incomplete and asymmetric information on the 
quality of governance institutions in the economy.  During normal times, when business 
runs as usual, information on the quality of governance is not observed.  However, with 
the advent of crises or new information, governance institutions face with a real 
examination.  Hence, the manner in which countries handle new conditions can influence 
the perception of governance by private investors.  This information also accumulates 
over time and provides a basis for long-term perceptions of governance quality 
throughout the countries. 
The advanced countries of today have built their investor-friendly and persistent 
governance institutions over long periods of time, after successfully passing certain 
historical tests.  However, in the short term, investors make their judgments on the 
quality of governance based on a numerous factors.  These factors certainly include some 
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historical episodes experienced by the country which can provide insight into the future 
potential performance of existing governance institutions.  Debt repudiation or the state’s 
appropriation of private property in the past, for example, definitely is taken into account 
in assessing the quality of country governance by entrepreneurs.  However, in addition to 
this type of backward looking behavior, entrepreneurs’ perception of the quality of 
governance is also shaped by existing and anticipated conditions in the future. In this 
regard, we argue that existing indices measuring the quality of governance capture 
investors’ concerns about the institutions quite well.   
 
5. The Econometric Analysis  
5.1. The Model Tested 
The primary purpose of the model tested is to disentangle the effects of 
governance on private investment.  More importantly, in this paper we want to make a 
horse-race among the different types of governance variables commonly used in the 
literature to distinguish the most vital ones in accelerating the private investment in our 
sample of developing countries.  
In the empirical model, endogenous variables are the share of private investment 
and the various measures of governance, namely “Quality of Administration” (QA), 
“Public Accountability” (PA), “Political Stability” (PS) and a global indicator of 
governance (GOV).  These endogenous variables are simultaneously determined by 
influencing each other. In order to account for this reverse causality, we establish a 
system of equations to estimate the share of private investment in GDP (PI) and quality 
of governance institutions (QI) simultaneously.  In the private investment equation, lower 
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quality of governance institutions is expected to reduce the private investment.  In the 
governance equation, private investment enters on the right side with an expected positive 
sign.  This simultaneous system of equations also enables us to take into account other 
factors that affect both private investment and governance institutions.   
This system of equations is estimated using three stage least squares by 
controlling other determinants of endogenous variables.  Three stage least square (3SLS) 
estimation allows to use the links between endogenous variables efficiently.  Since 
endogenous variables appear as regressors in other equations, they have to be 
instrumented out using exclusion restrictions. Initially, 3SLS regressions are run 
separately for QA, PS and PA. However, to complete the analysis, we have substituted in 
this system of equation the aggregate indicator of governance (GOV), which is calculated 
as the principal component analysis of all the initial indicators and which provides a 
summary of the three measures of governance.  
The model estimated is the following: 
itiitit XQIPI 11210 εααα +++=     (1) 
itiitit XPIQI 22210 εββγ +++=    (2) 
Where 
itPI  is the share of private investment in GDP 
itQI  represents the various indexes of governance (QA, PA, PS and GOV) 
iX 1  and iX 2  are the other control variables in private investment (PI) and 
governance (Gov) equations respectively 
it1ε  and it2ε  are the error terms of each equations.  i  indicates the country and t  
represents the time of the variable. 
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The determinants of private investment in the neoclassical flexible accelerator 
model include the expected aggregate demand (the accelerator) and the user cost of 
capital.  Hence, the private investment equation in our specification incorporates real 
interest rate (Realr) to capture the user cost of capital.  It also accounts for the GDP 
growth rate in last year (grow) to control for the accelerator effect.  These two variables 
are excluded from the governance equation (QI) in order to identify the system. 
Both of the equations, on the other hand, take into account the GDP per capita, as 
well as the variations in structural reform (SR) and human capital (H).  Structural reforms 
are characterized with trade policy (TP) and financial development. Financial 
development is proxied by the private credit by banks and other depository institutions 
(Pcr).  Trade policy is constructed as the commercial openness (calculated by 
aggregating the export and import in total GDP) from which we have subtracted the 
exports of oil and mining products, as well as the “natural trade openness” constructed by 
Frankel and Romer (1999).  The trade policy and financial development variables form 
the structural reform indicators after implementing the principal component analysis (see 
Annex 4 for results of PCA).  Structural reform is expected to stimulate private 
investment, as well as the institutional change for the better. 
Human capital (H) is expressed with life expectancy at birth, and average years of 
primary, secondary and higher schooling in the total population over 15 years old.  These 
variables are also aggregated with principal component analysis.  Human capital is 
widely considered to enhance the private investment and to lead to better governance 
institutions.  Therefore, human capital variable is expected to have positive coefficients in 
both of the equations.  
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GDP per capita is controlled in the investment equation to account for the 
neoclassical Solow growth model. Countries with lower GDP per capita are expected to 
gradually catch up with the more developed counterparts by having more capital 
investment over time. Moreover, GDP per capita accounts for possible externalities, such 
as greater market size on demand and supply of good and services, and finally on private 
investment. GDP per capita in governance equations represents the idea that more 
developed countries can afford to have better governance institutions (Azariadis and 
Lahiri 2002). Hence, a positive relationship is expected between GDP per capita and 
governance quality.  
Oil export as a percentage of total merchandise export also enters into both 
equations.  The typical natural curse hypothesis is taken into account by incorporating 
this variable into the investment equation. When a country relies more on natural 
resources extraction in its exports, there can be less incentive to invest for other products. 
This result, for example, may stem from the increase in the cost of labor (Rodriguez and 
Sachs, 1999). This variable also has an implication for the quality of governance 
institutions. Countries with less reliance on natural resources are expected to form better 
governance institutions.  The natural resource-abounded countries do not need to 
mobilize the society to enhance aggregate income.  The ruling class can control the 
economy by collaborating with a small number of people in the society.  Therefore, the 
production structure of the country does not generate good governance institutions in 
favor of the society (Ross 2001, Bellin, 2001).   Under these circumstances, the elite is 
also less inclined to provide better governance by considering the future effects of 
today’s enfranchisements (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001) and engage in more rent-
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seeking activities31.  Hence, the share of oil export in merchandise export is expected to 
reduce the quality of governance institutions. 
The tenure of the system (TenSyst) from Keefer et al. (2001) is excluded from the 
investment equation to identify the system of equations.  TenSyst reports the number of 
years that an administrative system -- regardless of whether autocratic or democratic -- 
lasts in the country.  The underlying idea to include this variable in the governance 
equation is to account for the fact that institutions settle over time. The longer the time 
passes with the existing system, the better institutions are established.  This exclusion 
restriction is quite reasonable considering that TenSyst has a direct impact on the 
governance institutions whereas its influence on private investment is more likely to be 
realized through its effect on these institutions.  
Finally, a regional dummy for the Middle Eastern and North African countries 
(MENA) appears as a right hand side variable in both of the equations.  One of our 
primary purposes is to understand the position of MENA countries among the other 
countries and to see whether MENA substantially diverges from the rest of the world in 
terms of private investment and of governance performance.   
5.2. Estimation Results 
Equations (1) and (2) have been estimated on an unbalanced panel of 31 
developing countries over 1980-2002 using the three stages least square estimations 
technique (3SLS). Four sets of regressions have been conducted, each one with a different 
indicator of governance. Table1 presents the estimation’s results of equations (1) and (2) 
when “Quality of Administration”, “Political Stability”, “Public Accountability” and 
“Governance” are taken into consideration respectively.  
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5.2.1 Administrative Quality 
 In Table 1 -- when “Administrative Quality” (QA) is used as a measure of 
governance – estimation results produce quite interesting conclusions. One of the most 
interesting outcomes concerns the Quality of Administration index which gives a positive 
and significant coefficient at the 5 percent level in the investment equation (1).  This 
result confirms that a low level of corruption, a good quality of bureaucracy, a clear 
security of property rights, a reasonable risk to operations, a sound taxation and 
regulation as well as better law and order are of first importance for the enterprises’ 
decisions to invest. This result makes a real contribution to the empirical literature on 
governance by validating, over a relatively long period of time, the role of a large set of 
governance variables on private economic performance.  
Our result is unambiguous and robust to the introduction of other explanatory 
variables. This is the case of structural reforms and human capital. The roles of these 
variables in explaining cross-country economic achievement has recently been 
questioned (Easterly and Levine; 2003). Our regression results indicate a significant 
impact of these variables on private investment decisions.  Hence, our estimations stress 
that, although the quality of governance constitutes a major factor in the private sector 
decisions, the role of economic policies cannot be disregarded.  Our result also confirms 
that firms in developing countries face constraints that are not accounted for in more 
developed economies and that deficiencies in trade policy, financial development and 
education have a long-term impact on private investment decisions and growth.  
Another conclusion of our model consists in validating the neoclassical theory of 
the firm in the case of developing countries. The accelerator variable has the expected 
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positive sign which implies that anticipations of economic growth induce more 
investment. Similarly, the interest rate appears to exert a negative and significant effect 
on private investment which is consistent with the user cost of capital theory. Both 
variables are highly significant, indicating that at the final stage, supply and demand 
considerations constitute major factors for the entrepreneurs to undertake a new 
investment project.  However, our model fails to verify the Solow hypothesis of 
decreasing return to scale of physical capital accumulation.  The coefficient of the GDP 
per capita variable, although negative, is not significant.  
Finally, estimation of equation (1) confirms the natural curse hypothesis. The 
coefficient of the oil export variable as a percentage of total merchandise export is 
significant and negative. Identically, the regional dummy for MENA countries exhibits a 
negative coefficient. MENA countries seem to be diverging from the rest of the world in 
terms of private investment which is the key determinant of long-term growth. However, 
this dummy variable is not significant at the conventional levels.  This result is likely to 
stem from the oil export variable in the system which significantly reduces the private 
investment.   
In the “Administrative Quality” equation (Table 1, column 2), our estimations 
reveal the positive impact of several factors on the quality of the administration.  This is 
the case of the GDP per capita which means that more developed countries entail better 
governance institutions. Also, private investment helps improve the administrative 
quality significantly at a 5 percent level.  This last result justifies the use of the 3SLSQ  
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Table 1. Estimation Results 
 
Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous 
  Variables Variables Variables Variables Variables Variables 
Explanatory Priv Inv QA Priv Inv QA Priv Inv PS Priv Inv PA Priv Inv GOV Priv Inv GOV 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
QA 1.99   2.07               
  
(1.98)**   (2.06)**                   
PS         3.51            
  
        (1.67)*               
PA            4.43         
  
            -1.6           
GOV                2.25   2.26   
  
                (1.99)**   (2.00)**   
Private   0.1       -0.065   -0.08  0.014     
Investment   (2.16)**       (-1.61)   (-1.53)   -0.667     
Structural 1.64   1.64   1.07   3.27   1.98  1.98   
Reforms (4.73)***   (4.75)***   -1.45   (4.86)***  (8.06)***  (8.07)***   
  
  0.11   0.31   0.5   -0.05   0.1   0.13 
  
  -1.04   (9.37)***   (4.86)**   (-.40)   -1.2   -1.46 
Human 0.62   0.57  -0.1   -0.05  0.36  0.35   
Capital (2.82)***  (2.63)***  (-0.2)   (-0.10)  -1.4  -1.36   
  
  -0.02   0.04   0.25   0.21   0.124   0.133 
  
  (-0.46)   -1.08   (5.21)***   (3.49)***   (3.27)*   (4.36)*** 
Oil -0.03  -0.03  -0.05   -0.05  -0.035  -0.038   
Exports (-2.66)***  (-2.91)***  
(-
2.86)***   (-2.90)***  (-2.97)***  (-3.14)***   
  
  0.0003   -0.003   0   -0.001   0   -0.001 
  
  -0.11   (-1.65)*   (-0.10)   -0.19   (-0.13)   (-0.49) 
GDP per 0  0  0   -0.01   0  0   
Capita (-0.28)  (-0.01)  (-0.42)   (-1.12)   (-0.84)  (-0.81)   
  
  0.0001   0.0001   0.0002   0   0.0003   0.0003 
  
  (3.54)***   (4.1)***   (4.04)***   (6.56)***   (8.72)***   (8.84)*** 
MENA -1.2  -1.1   -2.3   3.72   -0.34  -0.32   
Dummy (-1.21)  (-1.11)   (-1.75)*   -1.11   (-0.31)  (-0.29)   
  
  0.15   0.06   0.34   -1.14   -0.28   -0.29 
  
  -0.84   -0.38   (1.84)*   (4.91)***   (-1.91)**   (-2.09)** 
Rear -0.02   -0.036   -0.05   -0.05   -0.037   -0.035   
  
(-2.06)**   (-3.39)**   (-2.53)**   (-3.13)***   (-2.87)***   (-3.21)***   
Growth 0.22   0.2   0.22   0.29   0.22   0.21   
  
(3.29)***   (2.88)**   (3.09)***   (3.04)***   (3.53)***   (3.58)***   
Ten Syst   0.02   0.017   0.013   0.11   -0.015   -0.016 
  
  (4.36)***   (6.19)***   (3.71)***   (2.54)***   (5.75)***   (6.44)*** 
Constant 11.8 -1.53 11.8 -0.52 14 -0.2 11.1 -0.73 12.2 -0.82 12.2 -0.66 
  
(16.95)*** 
(-
3.20)*** (16.92)*** 
(-
6.52)*** (7.48)*** (-0.4) (16.34)*** -1.19 (15.55)*** (-2.14) (15.61)*** (-9.39) 
Numb obs 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 
1 %. See sources of data in footnote 32 
 
estimation technique in order to address – among other things – the two ways causality. 
Tenure of system also predicts better administrative quality at less than 1% significance 
level. 
Our estimations fail, however, to validate the negative impact of the share of oil 
export in merchandise export. This result contradicts the fact that countries with less 
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reliance on natural resources form better governance institutions.  More importantly, 
structural reforms and human capital do not appear to immediately improve the 
administrative quality. However, when estimating the system by eliminating private 
investment from equation (2), structural reforms appears to be positive and highly 
significant, other results being unchanged33 (see Table 1, column 4). This result seems to 
be due to the fact that the structural reforms index is correlated with private investment. 
Hence, the positive impact of private investment on administrative quality appears to be 
mainly due to the structural reforms which stimulate firms’ decisions to invest. This 
result confirms that, in addition to the direct link highlighted previously, economic 
reforms affect private investment through their impact on institutional quality. This two 
channel causality brings new empirical evidences on the link between institutions and 
private economic activity.  
5.2.2 Political Stability 
 When “Political Stability” is taken into consideration (columns 5 and 6, Table 1), 
the first interesting result is that this factor -- similar to “Administrative Quality” -- 
appears to have a significant and positive impact on the firms’ decisions to invest. This 
conclusion is in line with the findings of various authors which have been able to show -- 
using various indicators of political stability -- that a sound and stable political 
environment provides enterprises with more predictable conditions to invest.  
 Besides, our new set of estimations validates most of the conclusions drawn 
previously for “Administrative Quality”, with a few exceptions. First, structural reforms 
and human capital are still validated as important factors for private investment decisions. 
This time, however, they play their roles indirectly only, through improving political 
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stability. This conclusion constitutes quite an interesting empirical evidence.  Structural 
reforms, by leading to better economic performances, lower the discontent of the 
population and produce a more stable political environment. Education goes in the same 
direction.  
 Another small difference can be seen in the MENA dummy variable, which is 
now significant in both equations, though at the 10 percent level: MENA countries under- 
perform in private investment while appearing to be better in reaching more stable 
political systems. This finding is quite understandable considering that MENA countries 
display high government stability which is one of the main components in aggregate 
political stability indicator 
 Other conclusions such as the neoclassical investment model and the natural 
curve hypothesis in equation (1) of private investment, the positive impact of the tenure 
of the system and the better political stability of richer countries in equation (2) of 
institutional quality, hold in the case of the “Political Stability” index.  
5.2.3 Public Accountability 
 Columns 7 and 8 of Table 1 report the regression results when “Public 
Accountability” is controlled to gauge the quality of institutions.  Results are this time 
quite different. In fact, our estimations fail to find strong evidence that “Public 
Accountability” is detrimental for private investment.  Although some empirical evidence 
can been found in the literature (see in particular Pastor and Sung, 1995), this result may 
be explained by the unresolved debate on the potential role of democratic institutions on 
growth (see Glaeser et al., 2004), as well as by some deficiencies in the specification of 
our model. For the comparison purposes in this paper, we have estimated the same model 
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for each of our indicators of governance. Hence, our results are likely to stem from the 
fact that the underlying mechanisms to shape the Public Accountability are different from 
the mechanisms of Administrative Quality and Political Stability.  
 This set of estimations, however, seems to still validate that structural reforms 
encourage private investment decisions. This time, the link appears to be only direct and 
the coefficient of the structural reform indicator in the institutional quality equation 
[equation (2)] appears insignificant. Besides, as for “Political Stability”, education and 
health of the population seem to entail private investment by participating in the 
democratization process of the country. An interesting result also concerns the MENA 
dummy variable in “Public Accountability” equation. Its coefficient is now significant 
and negative. This finding confirms the deficit in democratic institutions of the MENA 
region, as already stressed by several authors (see in particular the World Bank, 2004). 
Moreover, following our estimations, richer countries exhibit better democratic 
institutions and natural resources exporters still show low private investment 
performances. The initials results for real interest rate, economic growth and tenure of 
system remain unaltered as well.  
 
5.2.4 Governance 
 Our last set of estimations takes into consideration the aggregate indicator of 
governance (GOV) which summarizes the information contained in the three previous 
indicators. Results of the regressions are reported in columns (9) to (12) of Table 1. This 
last set of estimations confirms most of the results obtained before. The aggregate 
indicator of governance appears to have a positive and significant coefficient which 
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validates the importance of this factor for the firm’s decisions to invest. Structural 
reforms are highly significant in enhancing the private investment. The effects of human 
capital work indirectly through affecting aggregate governance. Overall, MENA 
countries under-perform in terms of governance institutions. This result indicates the 
need for institutional reform in the MENA region, especially considering the positive and 
persistent role of governance institutions in private investment.   
 Other results remain the same as well which confirms the robustness of our 
previous results. An interesting point, however, can be seen in the fact that since Public 
Accountability is included in the aggregate indicator of governance34, this factor now 
actively participates in the firm’s decisions to invest. Even though this result has to be 
considered with caution, it can be seen as another evidence for the literature on the 
positive role of democratic institutions in the economic performance of the countries.  
 
6. Governance Institutions: How Much Can they Improve Private 
 Investment in MENA?  
In this section, we use the model estimated previously to determine which factors 
would improve the investment’s performances of our MENA countries. We evaluate, in 
particular, the contribution of the administrative quality, political stability and public 
accountability, which have revealed to be of primary importance in the firm’s decision to 
invest. We also consider the role of structural reforms and human capital. For this 
purpose, we simulate how much private investment the region would have achieved if 
governance institutions, structural reforms and human capital were improved by one 
standard deviation. This simulation has been done for two time periods, the 1980s and the 
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1990s, respectively. For the calculations, we use the last set of estimations which 
summarize the effects of the three sub component of governance (see Table 1, columns 9 
and 10).  
A first step has consisted in calculating the coefficients of the initial variables 
which explains the composite indicators of governance (GOV), structural reforms (SR) 
and human capital (H). The calculation is based on the estimated coefficients of these 
aggregate indicators in the regression (Table 1, column 9), as well as on the weights of 
each principal component in the aggregate indicator combined with the loading of the 
initial variables in each principal component (Annex 4) 35. In the case of human capital 
calculations, we consider the indirect impact on private investment through the 
improvement of the quality of governance institutions. We use in this case the coefficient 
of the human capital indicator in the governance equation (column 10, in Table 10) 
combined with the estimated coefficient of the governance indicators in the investment 
equation (column 9, in Table 1). Coefficients of the initial variables are presented in 
Annex 5 and contributions to private investment appear in Tables 2 and 3. In Tables 2 and 
3, the contribution of the “Administration Quality” index has been calculated by 
aggregating the contributions of its four sub-components36. The same thing has been done 
for “Political Stability” 37, “Public Accountability” 38, “Structural Reform” 39 and “Human 
Capital” 40.  
These simulations show quite interesting results (see Table 2). A first set of 
conclusions concerns the potentially significant impact of improved governance 
institutions in the region. An amelioration of one standard deviation of the 
“Administrative Quality” would have increased private investment by 1.4 percent of GDP 
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during the 1980s and the 1990s. This augmentation is of 1.1 to 1.2 percent of GDP in the 
case of “Public Accountability” and of 0.8 to 0.9 percent of GDP for an amelioration of 
the “Political Stability”. In total, private investment could have been higher by 3.4 to 3.5 
percent of GDP if governance institutions had been reformed in an appropriate way.  
Table 2. Private Investment to GDP 
(Increase with an improvement in) 
 Structural GOV (a)    Human Total 
 
Reforms (a) 
 QA PA PS Capital (b) Contributions (c) 
1980 2.3 3.5    0.4 6.1 
   1.4 1.1 0.9   
1990 3.0 3.4    0.5 6.8 
   1.4 1.2 0.8   
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Notes:  (a) Direct impact on private investment calculated from equation (9), Table 1.  
 (b) Indirect impact on private investment calculated from equations (9) and (10), Table 1.  
 (c) Sum of direct and indirect impact.  
Our calculations also point out that governance deficiencies have not been the 
only reasons of low private investment performance in MENA. Reforming the economy 
in other dimensions is necessary to boost private investment in the region. This has been 
the case over the whole period, but more importantly during the 1990s, where private 
investment could have been increased by 3 percent of GDP if structural reforms had been 
improved by one standard deviation (2.2 percent in the 1980s).  
On average, private investment could have reached 17.7 and 18 percent of GDP in 
the 1980s and the 1990s (compared to 11.6 and 12 percent observed) if governance 
institutions and structural reforms had been improved at the same time (see Table 3). If 
we add the indirect impact of human capital (0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP, through the 
amelioration of the governance institutions), private investment in Egypt could have been 
stimulated by 48 and 77 percent during the 1980s and the 1990s, and could have reached 
18.7 and 15.7 percent of GDP (compared to 12.6 and 8.9 observed), respectively. This 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.27 
 34 
percentage increase would have been of 64 and 54 percent in Iran (with a private 
investment ratio of 15.7 and 19.5 percent of GDP in this case), 51 and 68 percent in 
Morocco (with a ratio of private investment of 18.1 and 16.9 percent of GDP), and 45 
percent in Tunisia (19.7 and 21.7 percent of GDP for the private investment ratio). These 
figures are in line with the performances of the East Asian economies which have 
achieved, on average for our sample of countries, an investment ratio of 17.5 and 19.9 
percent of GDP during the two sub-periods41.  
Table 3. Private Investment to GDP 
 
 1980s  1990s 
 Observed Predicted Observed Predicted 
Egypt      (1) 12.6 18.7 8.9 15.7 
(2) 
 
(48) 
 
(77) 
Iran         (1) 9.6 15.7 12.7 19.5 
(2) 
 
(64) 
 
(54) 
Morocco (1) 12.1 18.1 10.1 16.9 
(2) 
 
(51) 
 
(68) 
Tunisia    (1) 13.6 19.7 14.9 21.7 
(2) 
 
(45) 
 
(43) 
Average  (1) 12.0 18.0 11.6 18.5 
                            Source: Authors’ calculations 
 Notes: (1): % GDP ; (2): % increase 
Our simulations also give a more precise diagnostic of which specific governance 
institutions would improve private investment performances in MENA. Contributions are 
calculated for each indicator of governance, as well as for structural reforms and human 
capital. Interesting conclusions relate to the impact of the different governance 
institutions. “Public Accountability” appears to be of primary importance in enhancing 
the confidence of private investors in MENA. An improvement of one standard deviation 
of civil liberties and political rights would have respectively increased private investment 
decisions by approximately 0.5 and 0.6 percent of GDP during the 1980s and the 1990s 
(see Table 4). This result clearly shows that democratic institutions matter for the region. 
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This finding can be linked to the significant deficit of MENA in terms of democratic 
institutions (see World Bank, 2004). This aspect gives to the region a significant scope 
for improving private investment performances in the future.  
On “Administrative Quality”, bureaucratic quality and corruption constitute other 
key factors for private investment decisions in the region. An improvement in the quality 
of the bureaucracy, as well as a reduction of the level of corruption by one standard 
deviation would have stimulated firms’ investment by 0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP for each 
factor. These findings confirm some conclusions of the literature, specifically on the role 
played by corruption in increasing the cost and risk of doing business. Besides, our 
calculations add to the subject by quantifying the importance of these two factors for the 
countries of our interest.  
On the side of “Political Stability”, attention should be given in the region to the 
reduction of internal and external conflicts, as well as of ethnic tensions. Narrowing the 
gap with politically more stable developing countries by one standard deviation would 
have helped private investment decision which could have been higher by 0.2 to 0.3 
percent of GDP, depending on the factor. Our findings corroborate that institutions 
associated with political instability have a disruptive effect on aggregate investment. This 
result makes of political stability a significant factor in reducing uncertainty and creating 
a friendly business environment in MENA.  
Another striking feature of this set of calculations relates to the critical role of 
financial development and trade policy within the MENA region. A more developed 
financial system in the region would have helped private firms to realize their investment 
project which could have been higher by 1.2 to 1.7 percent of GDP. A more open trade 
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policy would also have stimulated private investment by 1 to 1.3 percent of GDP. These 
results have to be related to the deficit of the region in these two fields of activity (see 
Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2004). These findings reveal that structural reforms 
represent another important question that MENA governments have to address if the 
region wants to catch up with more successful developing economies.  
Table 4. Private Investment to GDP 
(Increase with an improvement in) 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
7. Conclusion  
This paper empirically shows, for a panel of 31 developing countries studied 
during the 1980s and the 1990s, that governance institutions constitute an important part 
of the investment climate of the developing economies.  This result strongly holds for the 
“Quality of Administration” and confirms that a low level of corruption, a good quality of 
bureaucracy, a reliable judiciary, a strong security of property rights, a reasonable risk to 
operations, as well as a sound taxation and regulation contribute significantly to the 
firms’ decision to invest.  Our estimations also verify that “Political Stability”, by 
providing a sound and predictable environment to the enterprises, participates as well in a 
friendly business environment. These results add significantly to the literature on 
 
 trade priv 
 
corrup bur inves law 
 
pol civ 
 
gov int ext ethn 
 SR pol cred QA tion qual prof ord PA rights lib PS stab confl confl tens 
1980 2.2   1.4     1.1   0.9     
 
 1.0 1.2  0.45 0.53 0.19 0.28  0.53 0.57  0.10 0.27 0.30 0.27 
     
  
     
 
   
 
1990 3.0 
  
1.4 
    
1.2 
  
0.8 
    
  
 1.3 1.7  0.42 0.44 0.25 0.26  0.62 0.56  0.12 0.25 0.20 0.22 
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governance by validating the role of a large set of institutional variables on private 
economic performances over a relatively long period of time.  
 Our findings are unambiguous and robust to the introduction of other explanatory 
variables. This is the case of structural reforms -- in the form of trade openness and 
financial development -- and of human capital, which appear to play a significant role in 
private investment decisions. This result shows that firms in developing countries face 
constraints that are not accounted for in more developed economies. It also shows that -- 
contrary to recent works which make of governance institutions the dominant factor with 
little independent influence of economic policies (see Rodrick, Subramanina, and Trebbi, 
2002; and Easterly and Levine, 2003) -- economic policies and governance institutions 
both participate in the firms’ decisions to invest. We show as well that structural reforms 
and human capital contribute to the firms’ decisions to invest by also improving the 
quality of governance. These conclusions have been reached by estimating a 
simultaneous model of private investment and governance quality where economic 
policies and human capital concurrently explain both variables. These conclusions can be 
considered as an important contribution to the empirical literature on governance.  
 Our estimations find, in addition, some evidence that “Public Accountability” is 
detrimental to private investment.  Although our results have to be considered with 
caution, they can be regarded as contributing some empirical evidence to the unresolved 
debate on the potential role of democratic institutions on growth (see Glaeser et al., 2004 
and Pastor and Sung, 1995 for more conclusive studies).  
 In MENA, improved governance institutions would greatly stimulate private 
investment decisions. This is the case for all components of governance, with special 
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attention to civil liberties and political rights, corruption and bureaucratic quality, 
conflicts and ethnic tensions. By reforming substantially their governance institutions 
(i.e., by increasing by one standard deviation all components of governance during the 
1980s and the 1990s), MENA countries could have boosted private investment by 3.4 to 
3.5 percent of GDP. This result makes of governance a key variable for improving the 
investment climate in the region.  
Governance deficiencies, however, are not the only issues that MENA could 
address to encourage private investment in the region. Reforming the economy 
constitutes another powerful instrument that would also stimulate firms’ investment 
decisions. A more developed financial system would have permitted the private sector to 
implement more investment projects. One standard deviation increase during the 1980s 
and the 1990s would have raised the private investment ratio by 1.2 to 1.7 percent of 
GDP. Similarly, a more open trade policy would have stimulated private investment 
decisions by 1 to 1.3 percent of GDP during the same period. This makes of structural 
reforms an important issue that MENA governments also have to address if the region 
wants to catch up with more successful developing economies.  
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Notes  
 
1
. Africa (AFR), East Asia (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America (LAC), Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) and South Asia (SAS).  
2
. See in particular Rodrik (1999) and Frankel (2002). 
3
. See, for example, Knack and Keefer (1995), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002).  
4
. See Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003), and 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002).  
5
. See, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Taicharoen (2003). 
6
. See North (1990), Knack and Keefer (1995), Calderon and Chong (2000), Easterly and Levine (2003), 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002), and Saleh (2004).  
7
. See in particular Keefer (2002).  
8
. This shortcoming is a more general concern of the literature on democracy and development (see De 
Haan and Siermann, 1996, Prszeworski and others, 2000). The work of Pastor and Sung (1995) is however 
one of the few to have been able to show a positive effect of various indicators of democratic institutions on 
private investment in the developing world.  
9
. See in particular Rodrik (1991), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Le (2004); and Brunetti and Weder (1994).  
10
. The World Bank (2004) has investigated the correlation between private investment and the ICRG 
(1999) index of “investment profile”. This index is based on measures of contract enforceability, 
expropriation, profit repatriation, risk of operation, taxation and payment delays.  
11 
 See in particular Rodrik, Subramanina and Trebbi (2002), and Easterly and Levine (2003).  
12
. For the positive spillover from trade openness on institutions see Berg and Krueger (2003), Islam and 
Montenegro (2002), and Wei (2000). For the role of domestic competition, see Ades and Di Tella (1999), 
Djankov and others (2001), and the World Bank (2002).  
13
  This impact might also be explained by the fact that the measure of institutional quality is most often 
subjective and an amalgam of policy and institutional factors.  
14
. In trying to gauge the exogenous contribution of institutions, recent research has given particular 
attention to the possible role played by geographical and historical influences on institutional formation 
(see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robison, 2001, and Engelman and Sokoloff, 2002).  
15
. Various methods of aggregation have been used to categorize different types of institutions. See, in 
particular, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Taicharoen (2003), Kaufmann and others (2003), and the 
World Bank (2004).  
16.
 See Calderon and Chong, (2000), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) in the context of growth; 
See North (1981), Knack and Keefer (1995), Calderon and Chong (2000), Easterly and Levine (2003), 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), and Saleh (2004) in the context of investment.  
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17.
 See in particular Rodrik (1991) and Serven and Solimano (1993).  
18
. See De Haan and Siermann (1996), Prszeworski and Limongi (1993), Prszeworski et al. (2000).  
19.
 See in particular Rodrik (1991), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Le (2004), Brunetti and Weder (1994). In 
the growth context see also Alesina et al. (1996), Svensson (1998), Olson et al. (2000).  
20.
 See for example Greene and Villanueva (1991), Blejer and Khan (1984), and Serven (1997).  
21.
 See Shafik (1992) on Egypt ; Schmidt and Muller (1992) on Morocco, as well as Bisat, El-Erian, El-
Gamal and Mongelli (1996) on MENA.  
22.
 See in particular Shafik (1992), and Agenor and Montiel (1999) for a discussion and additional 
references.  
23.
 See for example, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
24.
 For the positive spillover from trade openness on governance quality, see Berg and Krueger (2003), 
Islam and Montenegro (2002) and Wei (2000). For the role of domestic competition, see Ades and Di Tella 
(1999), Djankov and others (2001), and the World Bank (2002).  
25
  See Lucas (1988), Psacharopoulos (1988), and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).  
26
 See in particular Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). 
27
 See Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002).  
28.
 See the World Bank (2005). 
29
  See Nabli and Véganzonès -Varoudakis (2004).  
30
  See Aizenmann and Marion (1999), and Everhart and Sumlinski (2001). 
31
 Aysan (2005) points out that this variable captures the “rentier effect”.  He notes that “it is easier for the 
elite to control and capture the rents from ‘point source’ resources.  Resource rents are generally high in oil 
production.  Around 80 percent of oil income is considered to be resource rent (Gylfason, 2001), while 
such rents are much lower for other types of products in industry or in agriculture.  A small work force is 
required to extract oil resources.  Most of the time, oil is extracted by foreign firms with sophisticated 
technical skills (Isham et al, 2002).  As a result, the ruling elite can exclude the majority of the population 
in extracting oil reserves.  In other words, there exists no incentive on the part of the elite to incorporate the 
society into increasing aggregate production.  Given the lack of economic preconditions, the citizens cannot 
generate pressure for increased literacy and political influence.  This lack of political influence further 
feeds the vicious cycle by not effectively and peacefully revealing public interest and preferences.” 
32
 Sources of data are as follows: the private investment series have been processed from various national 
and international sources (International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Development Indicators (WDI), 
Life Data Base (LDB), see section 4.1 for more details). The “Administrative Quality” and “Political 
Stability” indexes use ICRG (1999) data. The components of the “Public Accountability” indicator come 
from Freedom House (2002). The “Structural Reforms” index uses data from WDI, but the oil export series 
entering the trade policy indicator comes from the United Nations. In the “Human Capital’ indicator, the 
numbers of years of schooling are from Barro and Lee (1994) and from Barro (2000a and b), and the life 
expectancy series is from WDI. All aggregated indicators have been generated after implementing the PCA 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.27 
 41 
methodology (see Annex 4 for more details). Interest rates (Rear) have been calculated from IFS and 
TenSyst comes from Keefer et al. (2001). All other data are from WDI.  
33.
 Oil export also becomes significant in “Administrative Quality” equation at a 10 percent level. 
34.
 PA contributes significantly and with the right sign to GOV (see the results of the PCA in Annex 4).  
35.
 For more details on the methodology, see Nagaraj, Varoudakis and Véganzonès (2000).  
36.
 Theses sub-components are corruption, bureaucracy quality, investment friendly profile of 
administration and law and order (see section 2). 
37.
 Political Stability has been proxied by aggregating the following indicators: government stability, 
internal and external conflicts, and ethnic tensions.  
38.
 Public Accountability has been calculated by using civil liberties and political rights.  
39.
 The Structural Reform indicator contains trade policy and financial development.  
40.
 Human Capital is defined from life expectancy, and years of primary, secondary and tertiary education.  
41.
 For comparison purposes, we have benchmarked the effort represented by the improvement of one 
standard deviation of each initial indicator entering the governance (GOV), structural reforms (SR) and 
human capital (H) indicators, to the reforms achieved by the East Asian economies. These calculations are 
shown in Table A.6., Annex 6. Figures of the table are the level of reforms potentially reached by our 
MENA countries divided by the ones achieved by the East Asian economies. For example, the value 1 
means that an improvement of one standard deviation has increased the reform indicator in MENA to the 
level of the East Asian economies. As well, the value 1.2 means that the level reached by MENA is 20 
percent higher than the one observed in East Asia. Most of the time, the effort considered in the simulations 
gives to our MENA countries an advance in “Administrative Quality”, “Political Stability” and “Public 
Accountability” (during the 1990s in this case). MENA, however, would not catch up with East Asia in 
terms of structural reforms (except in the case of Tunisia).  
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Annex 1 
 
List of Countries 
 
List of Countries with High Quality Data (63 countries) 
  
Argentina Kenya* 
Bangladesh* Lithuania 
Barbados* Malawi* 
Belize Malaysia* 
Benin* Mauritius* 
Bolivia* Mexico 
Brazil* Moldova 
Bulgaria Morocco* 
Cambodia Namibia 
Chile* Pakistan* 
China* Panama 
Colombia* Papua New Guinea* 
Comoros Paraguay* 
Costa Rica* Peru* 
Cote d'Ivoire Philippines* 
Croatia Poland* 
Dominican Rep. Romania 
Ecuador* Serbia and Montenegro 
Egypt, Arab Rep.* Seychelles 
El Salvador South Africa* 
Estonia St Lucia 
Ethiopia St. Lucia 
Guatemala* St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Guinea-Bissau Thailand* 
Guyana Trinidad & Tobago* 
Haiti Tunisia* 
Honduras* Turkey* 
India* Uruguay* 
Indonesia* Uzbekistan 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Venezuela* 
 Yugoslavia (FR) 
 Due to the lack of corresponding data for some countries, only counties marked 
with an * are included in the final regressions 
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Annex 2 
Classification of Governance Institution by Kauffmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2003) 
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM, 2003) categorize governance institutions 
in six broad groups.  Their measures of governance indicators are based on several 
hundred variables measuring perceptions of governance drawn from 25 separate data 
sources constructed by 18 different organizations.  Their aggregate governance indicators 
aim to measure six different aspects of governance as follows:  
1- “Government Effectiveness” 
2- "Regulatory Quality"  
3- "Rule of Law" 
4- "Control of Corruption" 
5- "Political Stability and Absence of Violence" 
6- "Voice and Accountability" 
"Government Effectiveness" and "Regulatory Quality" clusters summarize 
various indicators on the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies.  "Government Effectiveness" is composed of a single grouping of responses on 
the quality of public service provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of 
civil servants, independence of civil service from political process and the credibility of 
government's commitment to policies.  These are considered as requisite conditions 
enabling governments to produce and implement sound policies and deliver more 
efficient redistribution.  "Regulatory Quality" measures governance by extracting 
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information from policy outcomes.  It includes measures of market-unfriendly policies 
such as excessive regulation of economy, price controls or inadequate bank supervision.   
 The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions which govern their 
interactions is categorized as "Rule of Law" and "Control of Corruption".  The "Rule of 
Law" cluster includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, such as perception of incidence of crime, 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and enforceability of contracts.  They 
also provide a cluster for "Control of Corruption" measuring perceptions of corruption, 
conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain.  The presence of 
corruption is often a manifestation of lack of respect for the rules which govern the 
interaction between state and citizens and hence represents inefficiency in governing the 
redistribution. 
 The quality of institutions is very much related to how authority figures are 
selected and replaced.  The "Political Stability and Absence of Violence" cluster 
combines several indicators which measure the perceived likelihood that the government 
in power will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means such 
as domestic violence and terrorism.  This index indicates the continuity of policies and its 
effects on the efficiency of redistribution.   
 The "Voice and Accountability" cluster is the closest to measures of democracy 
indicators.  KKM includes this cluster as an indicator of governance in an attempt to 
capture the process by which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection 
of governments.  This cluster includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects 
of the political process, civil liberties and political rights, as well as various indicators 
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measuring the independence of the media in an attempt to quantify the accountability of 
those in a position of authority.   
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Annex 3 
Our Governance Indicators 
 
Quality of Administration (QA) 
The Quality of Administration index is composed of four indicators from ICRG defined 
in the following manner: 
(i) Control over Corruption “is a measure of corruption within the political 
system.  Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it 
distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of 
government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power 
through patronage rather than ability, and, last but not least, introduces an 
inherent instability into the political process”. 
(ii) Quality of Bureaucracy indicates that “countries where the bureaucracy has 
the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services.  In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy 
tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an 
established mechanism for recruitment and training.  Countries that lack the 
cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in 
government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day 
administrative functions.” 
 (iii) Investment Profile “is a measure of the government’s attitude to inward 
investment as determined by an assessment of four sub-components: the risk to 
operations, taxation, repatriation and labor costs”. 
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(iv) Law and Order “are assessed separately.  The Law sub-component is an 
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order 
sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.”   
Public Accountability (PA) 
The second set of candidates measures the “Public Accountability”.  This index 
includes two indicators from Freedom House (FH): “Civil Liberties” and “Political 
Rights”. 
The “Civil Liberties” index mainly addresses the following questions:  
- Are there free and independent media, literature and other forms of cultural 
expressions? 
- Is there open public discussion and free private discussion? 
- Is there freedom of assembly and demonstration? 
- Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? 
- Are citizens equal under the law, do they have access to an independent and 
nondiscriminatory judiciary, and are they respected by the security forces? 
- Is there protection from unjustified imprisonment, exile or torture whether by 
groups that support or oppose the regime? 
- Is there freedom from war or insurgency situations? 
- Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or the equivalent, and is 
there effective collective bargaining? 
- Are there free professional and other private organizations? 
- Are there free businesses or cooperatives? 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.27 
 56 
- Are there free religious institutions, and free private and public religious 
expression? 
- Is there personal and social freedom, which include aspects such as gender 
equality, property rights, freedom of movements, choice of residence, and 
choice of marriage and size of family? 
- It there equality of opportunity –which includes freedom from exploitation by 
or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats,  or any 
other type of denigrating obstacle – to a share of legitimate economic gains? 
- Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption? 
 
The “Political Rights” index addresses the following questions:  
- Is the head of the state, head of government, or other chief authority elected 
through free and fair elections? 
- Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
- Are there faire electoral laws? 
- Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real 
power? 
- Do the people have the right to freely organize into different political parties 
or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open 
to the rise and fall of those competing parties or groupings? 
- Is there a significant opposition vote, a de facto opposition power, and a 
realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power 
through elections?  
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- Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, 
totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other 
powerful groups? 
- Do cultural ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-
determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal 
consensus in the decision-making process? 
- For traditional monarchies which have no parties or electoral process, does the 
system provide for consultation with the people to encourage discussion of 
policy, and to allow the right to petitions the rules? 
Political Stability (PS) 
The political stability index includes the following variables from ICRG:  
Government Stability “is a measure both of the government’s ability to carry out 
its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office.  This will depend on the 
type of governance, the cohesion of the government and governing party or 
parties, the closeness of the next election, the government’s command of the 
legislature, popular approval of government policies, and so on.” 
Internal Conflict “is an assessment of political violence in the country and its 
actual or potential impact on governance.  The highest rating is given to those 
countries where there is no armed opposition to the government and the 
government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its 
own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an ongoing civil 
war.” 
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External Conflict “is an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government 
and to inward investment.   It ranges from trade restrictions and embargoes, 
whether imposed by a single country, a group of countries, or the international 
community as a whole, through geopolitical disputes, armed threats, exchanges of 
fire on borders, border incursions, foreign-supported insurgency, and full-scale 
warfare.” 
Ethnic Tensions “measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to 
racial, nationality, or language divisions.  Lower ratings are given to countries 
where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are 
intolerant and unwilling to compromise.   Higher ratings are given to countries 
where tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist.” 
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Annex 4 : 
Principal Component Analysis 
 
Table A4.1: The Administrative Quality Indicator 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 2.23 0.56  
  P2 0.83 0.76  
  P3 0.51 0.89  
  P4 0.43 1  
 
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 P4 
Corruption 0.49 -0.57 0.06 0.65 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.54 -0.08 0.64 -0.54 
Investment profile 0.41 0.81 0.08 0.40 
Law and Order 0.54 -0.02 -0.76 -0.36 
 
QA = P1*(0.5577/0.7640) + P2*(0.2063/0.7640) 
 
************************************************************************  
 
Table A4.2: The Political Stability Indicator 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 2.24 0.56  
  P2 0.70 0.74  
  P3 0.69 0.91  
  P4 0.36 1.00  
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Loadings P1 P2 P3 P4 
Government  Stability 0.45 0.65 0.57 0.22 
Internal Conflicts  0.58 -0.06 -0.08 -0.81 
External Conflicts  0.48 0.18 -0.75 0.41 
Ethnic Tensions 0.47 -0.73 0.33 0.36 
 
PS = P1* (0.5604/0.7356) + P2* 0.1752 /0.7356)  
************************************************************************ 
Table A4.3.: The Public Accountability Indicator 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 1.88 0.94  
  P2 0.12 1  
 
 Loadings P1 P2 
 Political Rights  0.71 0.71 
 Civil Liberties 0.71 -0.71 
 
PA = P1 
 
Table A4.4.: The Governance Indicator 
Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2 
P1 3.94 0.39 
P2 1.64 0.56 
P3 1.2 0.68 
P4 0.91 0.77 
P5 0.69 0.84 
P6 0.47 0.89 
P7 0.43 0.93 
P8 0.33 0.96 
P9 0.26 0.99 
P10 0.13 1 
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Loadings P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Corruption 0.25 -0.15 0.61 0.19 0.00 0.53 0.46 0.06 -0.05 0.03 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.30 -0.13 0.35 0.51 -0.10 -0.68 -0.13 0.12 -0.10 0.03 
Investment profile 0.33 -0.03 -0.43 0.40 0.11 0.02 0.31 -0.63 0.18 -0.08 
Law and Order 0.37 -0.31 0.13 -0.12 0.06 0.20 -0.58 -0.05 0.59 -0.05 
Political Rights 0.26 0.63 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.09 -0.15 0.11 -0.06 -0.69 
Civil Liberties 0.26 0.63 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.08 -0.13 -0.01 0.06 0.71 
Government Stability 0.31 -0.20 -0.52 0.24 0.16 0.21 0.01 0.67 -0.16 0.06 
Internal Conflicts  0.41 -0.18 -0.03 -0.30 -0.16 0.10 -0.27 -0.31 -0.71 0.03 
External Conflicts  0.33 0.07 -0.14 -0.33 -0.73 -0.15 0.34 0.16 0.26 -0.02 
Ethnic Tensions 0.31 -0.04 0.08 -0.52 0.61 -0.36 0.34 0.07 0.06 -0.02 
 
GOV = P1*(0.3937/0.7696) + P2*(0.1641/0.7696) + P3*(0.1204/0.7696) + P4*(0.0915/0.7696) 
 
 
Table A4.5 : The Structural Reform Indicator 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 1.49 0.75  
  P2 0.59 1  
 
 
Loadings P1 P2 
Trade Policy 0.71 0.71 
Private Credit 071 -0.71 
 
SR = P1 
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Table A4.6: The Human Capital Indicator 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 3.14 0.78  
  P2 0.38 0.88  
  P3 0.31 0.96  
  P4 0.18 1  
 
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 P4 
Life Expectancy 0.52 -0.33 0.03 -0.79 
H1 0.50 -0.41 0.55 0.53 
H2 0.50 -0.05 -0.80 0.32 
H3 0.48 0.85 0.23 -0.03 
 
H = P1  
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Annex 5 
 
Table A.5 : Short-Term Coefficients of the Disaggregated Indicators 
A.5.1. Direct Effect on Private Investment (1) 
  Short-Term Coefficients 
  Standardized Level 
  
Index Variables 
Variables Variables 
  Corruption 0.49 0.45 
  Bureaucracy Quality 0.54 0.52 
  
GOV 
Investment Profile* 0.32 0.15 
  
 Law and Order 0.29 0.23 
  
 Political Rights 0.64 0.32 
  
 Civil Liberties 0.63 0.39 
  
 Government Stability  0.14 0.06 
  
 Internal Conflict  0.29 0.11 
  
 External Conflict 0.27 0.12 
  
 Ethnic Tensions  0.22 0.15 
  
    
    
  SR Trade Policy 1.40 0.05 
  
  Private Credit 1.40 0.07 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (1) Direct impact is calculated using the estimated coefficient of the aggregated 
indicators (GOV and SR, see equation (9), Table (1)), as well as the weights of each principal 
component in the aggregate indicators, combined with the loading of the initial variables in 
each principal component (see Annex 4).  
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A.5.1. Indirect Effect on Private Investment (1) 
 Short  Term Coefficients 
 Standardized Level Level 
 
Index Variables 
Variables (a) Variables (a) Variables (b) 
 H Life Expectancy 0.06 0.01 0.01 
 
 Primary Education 0.06 0.04 0.09 
 
 Secondary Education 0.06 0.09 0.19 
 
 Tertiary Education 0.06 0.51 1.14 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (1) Indirect impact is calculated using the coefficient of the human capital indicator in the 
governance equation (column 10, Table 1), multiplied by the coefficient of the governance indicator 
in the investment equation (column 9, Table 1), in addition to the weights of each principal 
component in the aggregate indicators, combined with the loading of the initial variables in each 
principal component (see Annex 4).  
(a) Coefficient entering the governance equation (2).  
(b) Coefficient entering the private investment equation (1).  
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Annex 6 
 
Table A. 6. 
Level of variables with an increase of one standard deviation 
compared to the actual level in East Asia 
 
  SR    QA    PA    PS     H  
 
trade priv corrup bur inves law pol civ gov int ext ethn life Iary Iiary IIIary 
  
pol cred tion qual prof ord rights lib stab confl confl tens exp       
1980s                      
Egypt 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.8 1.6 1.3 
Iran 0.4 1.2 1.4 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.8 0.4 1.4 1.1 0.9 1.5 1.0 
Morocco 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.1 0.9 1.9 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 
Tunisia 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.8 2.8 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.1 
1990s                      
Egypt 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.9 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.6 
Iran 0.6 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.4 
Morocco 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Tunisia 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.8 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Figures represent the level potentially reached by the MENA countries when increasing the control 
variables by one standard deviation divided by the levels achieved by the East Asian economies. For 
example, the value 1 means that an improvement of one standard deviation has increased the reform 
indicator in MENA to the level of the East Asian economies. Similarly, the value 1.2 indicates that the level 
reached by MENA is 20 percent higher than the level observed in East Asia.  
 
 
